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Abstract. We investigate how di⁄erent types of merger a⁄ect input prices,
research levels and equilibrium pro￿ts in vertical market structures when there is
research activity in the upstream market that spills over to the downstream retail-
ers. To do so, we develop a very simple model where three downstream Cournot
oligopolists are served by monopolist plant-speci￿c input suppliers. We consider a
situation in which both vertical and horizontal integration are feasible and we inves-
tigate which equilibrium structures are likely to emerge following an initial merger
between two units.
JEL classi￿cation: L13, L22, L41
Keywords: Integration, research spillovers, sequential mergers.
1. Introduction
Consider an industry with two vertically related activities, where plant-speci￿c input sup-
pliers sell to their respective downstream retailer, each producing a di⁄erentiated product.
Firms in the downstream market compete in quantities and bene￿t from the research ac-
tivity of their input speci￿c supplier.
This market structure may be justi￿ed in the presence of switching costs, arising from
sunk investments and asset speci￿cities, that decrease the value of any outside option.
A typical example may be a contract between a local farmer and a supermarket that
enjoy a certain degree of local market power, because of the concentration of the market.
The farmer specialises in the production of the products requested by the supermarket;
choosing a di⁄erent retailer may oblige the farmer to move towards di⁄erent products and
thus to face new sunk investments, whose cost would add to the ￿xed costs associated with
the previous contract. On the other side for the supermarket choosing a new supplier, that
is already locked in a contract with another supermarket, may mean a reduction in the
degree of di⁄erentiation of its product with respect to its competitors. Thus our analysis
would apply to situations in which both sides of the vertical structure are su¢ ciently
￿This paper is a modi￿ed version of chapter 4 of my Phd thesis at the University of York. I am grateful
to my supervisor, Peter Simmons, for his valuable comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this
draft. The responsibility for remaining errors lies entirely with me.
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concentrated and the trade between upstream and downstream units is characterised by
strong asset speci￿cities. This is a plausible assumption if we consider that concentration
is rapidly increasing also at the retail level as the success of some supermarket chains in
several countries seems to con￿rm, Dobson and Waterson, (1999).
The main purpose of our work is to analyse the incentives for ￿rms to merge in this
type of setting, when both horizontal and vertical integration are feasible and there are
no merging restrictions. To do so, after discussing some related literature in section 2, in
section 3 we develop a benchmark scenario where three oligopolist downstream units are
served by their input speci￿c suppliers. We then analyse how the equilibrium outcome
changes when di⁄erent types of merger occur.
Starting from a pre-merger situation, we show that there are always incentives for the
￿rst two units to merge. If a merger occurs, however, some of the outsiders will be harmed
and will have therefore incentives to respond with a countermerger. This may lead to a
new merger con￿guration where the initial merged units may be worse o⁄; thus even if
pro￿table when considered in isolation, an initial merger might not be carried through if
it encourages subsequent mergers that have a negative e⁄ect on the pro￿tability of the
initial merged units.
In sections 4 and 5, we consider two di⁄erent initial mergers and we investigate which
equilibrium market structure is likely to emerge when both horizontal and vertical inte-
gration are possible. We don￿ t consider as a possible outcome the case in which all the
upstream/downstream units horizontally integrate, because this would lead to excessive
concentration.
Suppose that the initial merger is between a downstream unit and its speci￿c input
supplier. In section 4, we show that this type of merger is always pro￿table for the
participants, but always unpro￿table for the outsiders. Thus there exist incentives for
the excluded ￿rms to react by merging. The main purpose of section 6 is to show how
an initial vertical merger may trigger successive mergers by the ￿rms left out. If all theHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 3
units vertically merge, then the initial merged units are worse o⁄, but if the products are
su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated and the externality e⁄ects are not too strong, then the pro￿ts
of the industry as a whole can be shown to increase. We also consider the case, in
which, in response to a vertical merger, the downstream outsiders react by merging. This
leads to a new merger con￿guration where mergers are always pro￿table for the initial
vertically integrated unit but likely to be unpro￿table for the suppliers to the downstream
participants; there are therefore incentives for these ￿rms to merge in turn. If a merger
between these units occurs then the initial vertically integrated unit still gains, with
respect to a pre-merger situation, but the pro￿tability of the downstream merged units
decreases. Anticipating the reactions of their suppliers, the downstream merged units
might try to preempt this merger by vertically integrating. This leads to the last merger
con￿guration where all the units are integrated vertically and the initial downstream
outsiders are also integrated horizontally. Thus an initial vertical merger could lead to
the following new mergers con￿gurations:
a) three vertical mergers: following a vertical merger, the downstream outsiders re-
spond by integrating vertically with their input speci￿c suppliers
b) one vertical merger and one downstream merger: following a vertical merger, the
downstream outsiders integrate horizontally
c) vertical integration and downstream and upstream mergers: following a vertical
merger, both the downstream and upstream outsiders integrate horizontally
d) downstream mergers and vertical integration: following a vertical merger, the down-
stream merged units vertically integrate with their input speci￿c suppliers
Suppose alternatively that the initial merger is between two downstream units. In sec-
tion 5, we show that this type of merger is always pro￿table for its participants but likely
to be unpro￿table for their suppliers, who might have therefore incentives to respond by
coordinating their price and research decisions. This may lead to a new merger con￿gu-
ration where the initial participants are worse o⁄. When this happens and if there are noHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 4
merging restrictions, the initial participants might try to vertically integrate to preempt
a merger between their input suppliers. In this new merger con￿guration, however, the
outsiders would be in a position of a clear disadvantage and would have therefore incen-
tives to integrate in turn. Thus an initial horizontal merger between two downstream
units could lead to the following new merger con￿gurations:
e) downstream and upstream mergers: following a downstream merger, the input
suppliers of the participants respond by merging
f) downstream mergers and vertical integration: the downstream merged units inte-
grate vertically with their input speci￿c suppliers
g) downstream mergers and vertical integration: following a vertical merger between
the downstream units with their input speci￿c suppliers, the outsiders react by integrating
vertically.
In these contexts, vertical integration gives rise to three di⁄erent gains:
￿ it internalises the pricing externality and the research spillover and hence it lowers
the cost for the integrated units and induces more research
￿ it may preempt a horizontal merger between the suppliers of the downstream merged
units (only in merger con￿gurations c and f)
￿ it avoids the losses coming from being non-integrated after a merger between the
downstream merged units with their input speci￿c suppliers (in merger con￿gura-
tions g)
A downstream horizontal integration instead is associated with the following gains:
￿ it allows the merged units to bene￿t from an additional research/demand induced
externality e⁄ect. This is modelled by assuming that the research activity of each
participant￿ s supplier spills over to the other participantHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 5
￿ it reduces the monopoly power of the input speci￿c suppliers and hence it may
involve lower input prices but also lower research for the participants (in merger
con￿guration b)
￿ it avoids the losses from not being integrated after a vertical merger but may trig-
ger a horizontal merger between input suppliers (in merger con￿gurations b and g
respectively)
There are then indirect e⁄ects whose nature and intensity vary with the merger con￿g-
uration. For instance, when only vertical integration is feasible, the internalisation of the
research spillover induces more research from the integrated units but the internalisation
of the pricing externality involves a cost advantage that modi￿es the incentives for these
￿rms to decrease research when competition on the ￿nal market becomes ￿ercer. We will
show that these incentives are stronger when competition is less ￿erce and the demand
spillovers are larger. This su¢ ces to erode the competitive advantage of the integrated
units as the gains from the internalisation of the pricing externality decrease.
The intensity of this e⁄ect however depends on the number of units that integrate
vertically.
When all the units integrate vertically, the gains from the internalisation of the pricing
externality are higher and therefore the incentives to decrease research stronger. When
only one unit integrates vertically instead the cost advantage for the integrated unit is
determined by the input price faced by the non-integrated units, which is lower. Thus the
incentives to decrease research when competition gets ￿ercer are now smaller and mergers
are always pro￿table for the participants.
When only horizontal integration in the downstream market is feasible, the partici-
pants bene￿t from a merger induced externality e⁄ect that reduces the incentives for the
outsider￿ s supplier to decrease research (and input prices) when competition on the ￿nal
market gets ￿ercer. Thus, the downstream outsider always faces worse cost conditions,Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 6
only partially compensated by more intense research activity from its supplier, when the
margins to pro￿tably increase ￿nal prices are lower. This su¢ ces to give the participants
a competitive advantage and to reduce the demand losses for the downstream outsider,
who may now gain from a merger. A horizontal merger in the downstream market how-
ever tends to decrease the monopoly power of the participants￿suppliers; thus, following a
downstream merger, the participants￿suppliers will reduce research and input prices, un-
less, as we will see, the products are strongly di⁄erentiated. In this case, in fact, stronger
merger induced externality e⁄ects tend to intensify the research activity of the partici-
pants￿suppliers thus allowing them to set higher prices for their inputs and to earn higher
pro￿ts. If however the products are not too di⁄erentiated the participants￿suppliers are
forced to decrease research and input prices with negative e⁄ects on their pro￿tability. In
this case, they might have incentives to react by merging to recover the lost pro￿ts.
The main purpose of section 7 is to show how a horizontal merger in the downstream
market may trigger successive mergers by the ￿rms left out. We ￿rst investigate the case
in which, following a downstream merger, the input speci￿c suppliers respond by coor-
dinating their price and research decisions. This leads to a new merger con￿guration,
where, due to the internalisation of the research spillover, the upstream participants pro-
duce more research and set higher input prices, but only if the merger induced externality
e⁄ect is su¢ ciently strong or if the products are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated. When both
the degree of product di⁄erentiation and the merger induced externality are su¢ ciently
strong, mergers may still be pro￿table for the downstream participants. When the degree
of product di⁄erentiation decreases, competition on the ￿nal market gets ￿ercer and all
the input suppliers are induced to decrease their research intensity. Since however the
downstream participants bene￿t from an additional demand enhancing e⁄ect, the incen-
tives to decrease research are stronger for the upstream participants; thus research and
therefore demand tend to decrease more for the downstream participants but without
inducing a corresponding decrease in input prices. This obviously contributes negativelyHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 7
to the pro￿tability of the downstream participants.
If there were no restrictions to merging, both the upstream and downstream partici-
pants could earn higher pro￿ts by vertically integrating. This type of merger in fact gives
rise to two di⁄erent gains: a demand enhancing gain, induced by the horizontal merger in
the downstream market, and the internalisation of the pricing externality, induced by the
vertical integration of the downstream participants with their input speci￿c suppliers. As
a result, research activity and demand increase for the participants but fall for the down-
stream outsider. Since however now the outsiders are in a position of clear disadvantage,
they might have incentives to respond by integrating vertically. This leads to the last
merger con￿guration where the only element of di⁄erentiation between the participants
is the merger induced externality e⁄ect. Thus the problem reduces to the analysis of the
e⁄ects of a horizontal merger when there are merger induced gains and all the players
face identical cost conditions. It is well known from the literature that, in the absence of
spillovers, mergers of this type are always more pro￿table for the outsiders, Salant et al.,
(1983), Deneckere and Davidson, (1985). Thus the strength of the research spillover will
be decisive in determining which players earn more.
In section 8 we identify which equilibrium merger con￿gurations are likely to emerge:
we show that when both the research spillover and the merger induced e⁄ect are su¢ ciently
strong, horizontal integration is always more pro￿table for the initial merged units; when
instead the merger induced externality is weak, the initial merged units might earn more
by integrating vertically. In both scenarios, however, complete vertical integration is never
an equilibrium outcome when both horizontal and vertical integration are feasible.
In section 9 we conclude and we make some suggestions for future research.
2. Related literature
Most of the existing studies on vertical integration assume that upstream units have all
the market power and make take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers to downstream ￿rms. For instance,
Ga-lor, (1990), and Jansen, (2003), analyse the conditions under which integration andHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 8
separation coexist in equilibrium, when there is a limited number of upstream ￿rms and
many downstream units with zero reservation payo⁄s. Ga-lor considers a market of n
producers, each producing a di⁄erentiated product and facing a linear demand function.
Firms compete in prices, and each producer may decide whether to sell directly to con-
sumers or to delegate the sales to an agent, selected from a large population of interested
individuals. If the contracting costs are not too high, then the unique equilibrium is for
each producer to be represented by an agent. Coexistence of integration and separation
is never an equilibrium, since the bene￿ts from contracting with an agent are increasing
with the number of producers who choose to be represented. In quantity setting games,
instead, such coexistence may occur, Jansen, (2003), if there are no vertical externalities
among vertically separated ￿rms.
Hart and Tirole, (1990), O￿ Brien and Sha⁄er (1992), McAfee and Schwartz (1993),
using general demand functions, show how the adoption of unobservable contracts, when
an upstream monopolist sells to many downstream units, gives rise to a commitment
problem that reduces the monopoly power of the upstream producer.
The assumption that upstream units have all the market power may be justi￿ed when
the upstream market is much more concentrated than the downstream market, where
the entry barriers would be therefore so low that all the downstream pro￿ts would be
extracted. Casual empiricism however suggests that concentration is increasing also at
the retail level and the success of some supermarket chains in several countries would
seem to con￿rm this tendency, Dobson and Waterson, (1999).
Recent studies have therefore moved in the opposite direction, assuming that retailers
have all the market power and may therefore propose contracts that have the e⁄ect of
reducing competition in the product market, Sha⁄er, 1991.
All these studies however focus on the welfare implications of di⁄erent types of con-
tracts when the bargaining power is concentrated on only one side of the vertical struc-
ture. We are instead interested in the pro￿tability of di⁄erent types of mergers when eachHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 9
downstream unit is engaged in a bilateral monopoly situation with its independent input
supplier.
There is an extensive literature identifying the incentives for ￿rms to vertically inte-
grate when both sides of the market are su¢ ciently concentrated. For instance, Greenhut
and Ohta, (1976), show that successive vertical mergers between monopolist input sup-
pliers, with ￿xed proportion coe¢ cients, and Cournot-oligopolist retailers provide partic-
ipants with greater pro￿ts and costumers with greater output and lower prices. Similar
welfare gains are attained in the case of Cournot-oligopolist input suppliers, Greenhut
and Ohta, (1979). The typical scenario is that of two vertical related activities, where m
oligopolist ￿rms in the upstream market produce a homogenous input, used by n down-
stream oligopolist units to produce a ￿nal good, according to a linear technology. The
￿nal market demand is a general decreasing function of the market price and involves
negligible cross elasticities of demand. In this context, if l ￿ min(m;n) units vertically
integrate, the equilibrium price decreases, while the equilibrium quantity increases and
the participants are always better o⁄ than any outsider. A relevant question is whether
the welfare e⁄ects of vertical integration are related to the assumptions on the production
technology and market structure. This issue has been investigated by Abiru, (1988), who
extends the model of successive Cournot oligopolies to the case of a ￿nal market demand
with constant elasticity and a C. E. S. production function. He shows that, also in this
case, the e⁄ect of vertical integration of downstream ￿rms with upstream units is to lower
the ￿nal product price and therefore to increase the equilibrium quantity.
An interesting issue that emerges from this literature is that of endogenous vertical
structures. Greenhut and Ohta (1979) show, for the case of vertically connected Cournot
duopolies, that, when there is an equal number of upstream and downstream ￿rms, inte-
gration is the equilibrium structure: starting from a pre-merger situation, since vertical
integration increases the pro￿ts of the ￿rst merging units, there is an incentive to inte-
grate vertically. As a result of this merger, however, all the outsiders and the industryHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 10
as a whole would su⁄er from a decrease in pro￿ts. This would create new incentives for
the excluded ￿rms to merge in order to recover the lost pro￿ts. Thus, in the absence
of antitrust regulations, the equilibrium outcome would be a situation in which all the
￿rms integrate vertically, the individual pro￿ts are lower than in a pre-merger situation
and it is not possible to go back to this better state unless all the ￿rms simultaneously
and cooperatively disintegrate. When however there are unequal numbers of ￿rms in the
two markets, Abiru et al., (1998), show that complete vertical integration is the unique
equilibrium structure only when the number of upstream units exceeds the number of
downstream units.
This framework also allows us to analyse the pro￿tability implications of horizontal
mergers when input prices are endogenous. While there is an extensive literature on the
e⁄ects of horizontal mergers when ￿rms face constant marginal costs of production, there
has been very little concern on how downstream mergers may in￿ uence the pricing behav-
iour of the input suppliers and therefore the competition between downstream units in
oligopolist markets. There are however some remarkable exceptions1. For instance, Lom-
merud et al., (2003), analyse the e⁄ects of a horizontal merger in a quantity setting game
with three downstream ￿rms producing di⁄erentiated products when the input suppliers
are organised in three di⁄erent structures. They distinguish between ￿rm-speci￿c, plant-
speci￿c and industry-speci￿c input suppliers and show that, for the case of plant-speci￿c
input suppliers, a horizontal merger between two downstream units, by inducing lower
input prices, may be pro￿table for values of the parameters for which, with exogenous
prices, it would be unpro￿table. This type of merger however tends to reduce the pro￿ts
of the suppliers to the merged units and may therefore create incentives for these units to
1Ziss (2001), using a model of Cournot competition with homogenous products, shows that the prof-
itability of a horizontal merger may be enhanced by delegating the output decision to a manager, with
an appropriate incentive scheme. Since the incentive scheme is endogenous and therefore a⁄ected by
the merger, it may be assimilated to the case of endogenous input prices. Horn and Wolinsky, (1988),
consider a bilateral monopoly model to analyse how input prices and pro￿ts are a⁄ected by di⁄erent
structures of the upstream and downstream market. These studies however focus on the pro￿tability of
single mergers considered in isolation and don￿ t investigate the incentives for the ￿rms left out to react
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merge in turn, with negative e⁄ects on the pro￿tability of the initial merged units.
Our work is also related to the literature on sequential mergers when there are no
vertical relations among ￿rms. For instance, Nilssen and Sorgard, (1998), using a linear
Cournot model with an exogenously ￿xed number of ￿rms, show how an initial merger
may trigger or preempt subsequent mergers. Gowrisankaran, (1996), analyses how mergers
may a⁄ect entry in an industry where merger, entry, exit and production decisions are
made in each period.
To our knowledge, the only model studying sequential mergers when both horizontal
and vertical integration are possible is Colangelo￿ s, (1995), who analyses preemptive merg-
ing in two di⁄erent game settings: a) a model where an upstream monopolist, U1, sells
an input to two downstream ￿rms, D1 and D2, each producing a di⁄erentiated product;
b) a model where the same downstream units, D1 and D2, are served by an upstream
Bertrand duopoly, U1 and U2. In the ￿rst stage of game a, ￿rms U1 and D1(D2) bid
for ￿rm D2(D1); the outcome of the bid game determines which type of merger will take
place (either vertical or horizontal integration). In the second stage of the game, the input
supplier sets the input price, while in the third stage the downstream units compete in
prices. Game b has the same time structure as game a, but, because of the presence of two
upstream suppliers competing in prices, three possible merger con￿gurations may emerge
from the bid game; i) one vertical integration; ii) one upstream merger; iii) one down-
stream merger. Colangelo ￿nds that vertical mergers always preempt horizontal merger in
the ￿rst game, but that horizontal mergers prevail over vertical integration in the second
game when the products are close substitutes. Further, when the excluded ￿rms may re-
spond to an initial merger with a subsequent countermerger, complete vertical integration
may be an equilibrium outcome only when all the ￿rms bid for an upstream unit.
3. A Benchmark
We consider a very simple model in which the ￿nal market is served by three ￿rms pro-
ducing a di⁄erentiated product. Let qi denote the quantity produced and sold by ￿rmHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 12
i = 1;2;3. We assume that all the downstream ￿rms face a constant and identical pro-
duction cost, equal to CD. For simplicity, but without loss of generality, we set CD = 0.
The demand facing the individual downstream ￿rm is:
pi = Ai ￿ qi ￿ b
3 X
j=1
qj, i 6= j, b 2 (0;1) (1)
with Ai = A + Bixi, where xi is the research activity of the plant speci￿c supplier to
improve the quality of its input and 0 ￿ Bi ￿ 1 is a parameter re￿ ecting the ability of
the individual ￿rm to transform the input into a higher quality ￿nal product, for which
the representative consumer is willing to pay more.
Alternatively we could think of xi as the advertising e⁄ort of each plant speci￿c input
supplier which tends to increase the market size of the downstream retailers.
We consider a very simple production function, in which one unit of input is required
to produce one unit of output. Let wi be the cost per unit of input for the ithdownstream
￿rm and suppose that the plant speci￿c suppliers bear all the research/advertising costs;
these are assumed to be quadratic, x2
i.
Then the individual downstream ￿rm i chooses quantity to maximise:
￿iD =
0






and each plant speci￿c input supplier i, knowing qi = qi(wi;xi), chooses price wi and
research e⁄ort xi to maximise:
￿iU = wiqi ￿ x2
i
To better clarify the con￿guration of the game, we o⁄er a graphical representation of
the relationships between downstream and upstream units, Figure 1.
This is a three-stage game with the following time structure:
in stage 1, the ￿rm speci￿c input suppliers choose independently the research e⁄orts;Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 13
Figure 1: Benchmark
in stage 2, the same units set their input prices;
in the third and last stage, the independent downstream units compete a la Cournot
on the ￿nal product market. We solve the game using backward induction.
Solving for the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in the retail market, assuming that
all the ￿rms have identical abilities, Bi = B for all i = 1;2;3, we get the following
candidate equilibrium quantities:
q1 =
A(b ￿ 2) ￿ bB(x2 + x3 ￿ x1) ￿ b(w3 + w2 ￿ w1) ￿ 2Bx1 + 2w1
b2 ￿ b ￿ 2
q2 =
A(b ￿ 2) ￿ bB(x1 + x3 ￿ x2) ￿ b(w1 + w3 ￿ w2) ￿ 2Bx2 + 2w2
b2 ￿ b ￿ 2
q3 =
A(b ￿ 2) ￿ bB(x1 + x2 ￿ x3) ￿ b(w1 + w2 ￿ w3) ￿ 2Bx3 + 2w3
b2 ￿ b ￿ 2
Given the equilibrium quantities, the ￿rm speci￿c input suppliers set prices so as to
maximise pro￿ts;
w1 =
A(2b + 8 ￿ 3b2) ￿ b2B(x1 + x2 + x3) + Bx1(6b + 8) ￿ 2bB(x2 + x3)
4(3b + 4)Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 14
w2 =
A(2b + 8 ￿ 3b2) ￿ b2B(x1 + x2 + x3) + Bx2(6b + 8) ￿ 2bB(x1 + x3)
4(3b + 4)
w3 =
A(2b + 8 ￿ 3b2) ￿ b2B(x1 + x2 + x3) + Bx3(6b + 8) ￿ 2bB(x1 + x2)
4(3b + 4)
We can now solve for the ￿rst stage of the game, where the ￿rm speci￿c input suppliers,
given the equilibrium quantities and input prices, set simultaneously and non coopera-
tively the research e⁄ort so as to maximise pro￿ts. Solving the ￿rst order conditions of
the individual input suppliers￿pro￿ts with respect to xi, we get the following equilibrium
research e⁄orts:
x1 = x2 = x3 = ￿
(b + 2)(b2 ￿ 6b ￿ 8)BA
(b + 2)(b2 ￿ 6b ￿ 8)B2 + 32(3b + 4)(b + 1)
where
(b + 2)(b2 ￿ 6b ￿ 8)B2 + 32(3b + 4)(b + 1) > 0





(b + 2)2(3b + 4)2A2








(b + 2)(b2 ￿ 6b ￿ 8)2B2 + 32(b + 1)(b ￿ 2)(3b + 4)2￿
[(b + 2)(b2 ￿ 6b ￿ 8)B2 + 32(3b + 4)(b + 1)]
2
where (b + 2)(b2 ￿ 6b ￿ 8)2B2 + 32(b + 1)(b ￿ 2)(3b + 4)2 < 0 for B ￿ 1
4. One vertical merger
In this section we consider the case in which, starting from a pre-merger situation, one
downstream unit integrates vertically with its input speci￿c supplier, Figure 2. We ￿nd
that this merger is always pro￿table for the participants and always unpro￿table for theHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 15
Figure 2: One vertical merger
outsiders, Figure 3. A vertical merger in fact gives rise to two di⁄erent gains: it internalises
the pricing externality and hence it creates a cost advantage for the integrated unit; it
also internalises the research spillover and thus induces more research from the integrated
unit.
Before discussing the pro￿tability implications of this merger, we brie￿ y describe the
structure of the game. Let ￿V 1 denote the post-merger pro￿ts of the unique vertically
integrated unit;
￿V 1 = p1q1 ￿ x2
1
while the pro￿ts of the other downstream units and their input speci￿c suppliers are
respectively given by:
￿D2 = (p2 ￿ w2)q2
￿D3 = (p3 ￿ w3)q3Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 16
￿U2 = w2q2 ￿ x2
2
￿U3 = w3q3 ￿ x2
3
Starting from the third stage of the game, the vertically integrated unit and the in-
dependent downstream ￿rms choose simultaneously and independently quantities so as
to maximise their individual pro￿ts. Given the candidate equilibrium quantities, in the
second stage of the game, the two upstream outsiders choose input prices; in the ￿rst stage
of the game, the same upstream units and the initial integrated unit, knowing qi = qi(xi)
and wi = wi(xi), choose the pro￿t maximising levels of research, xi.
This merger is pro￿table for the participants if ￿V 1 > ￿C
D + ￿C
U . As can be seen
in Figure 3, which represents the locus ￿V 1 = ￿C
D + ￿C
U, as long as B ￿ 1, this merger
is always pro￿table for the participants and always unpro￿table for any outsider. This
happens because the internalisation of both the pricing and the research externality allows
the integrated unit to set a lower ￿nal price and to increase research. Thus, research and
demand increase for the integrated unit. The independent downstream ￿rms respond by
decreasing their prices, but by a smaller amount, since they have still to pay the input
price, which however decreases. Lower input prices for the downstream outsiders however
imply lower research from their suppliers. Thus research and therefore demand decrease
for the downstream outsiders and this obviously contributes negatively to the pro￿tability
of both the downstream and upstream outsiders.
4.1. Stackelberg oligopoly. Assume that the ￿rm that vertically integrates with its
speci￿c input supplier is able to identify the reaction functions of the non colluding ￿rms
and therefore, in the absence of antitrust regulations, to lead them accordingly. For the
case of quantity competition, the problem of the merged units is:Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 17
Figure 3: Merger pro￿tability for the unique vertically integrated unit
max
q1
￿1 = (A + Bx1 ￿ q1 ￿ b(R2(q1) + R3(q1)))q1 ￿ x2
1
where R2(q1), R3(q1) denote the reaction functions of the non-colluding ￿rms.
The ￿rst order condition of the integrated unit determines the candidate equilibrium
quantities that may be used to derive input price, research and pro￿t levels in the asym-
metric Nash Equilibrium. More speci￿cally, given the candidate equilibrium quantities,
the upstream outsiders set the input prices so as to maximise their individual pro￿ts;
replacing the candidate equilibrium quantities and input prices into the pro￿ts of the
integrated unit and the upstream outsiders, the Nash equilibrium research levels may be
found solving the ￿rst order conditions of these units￿maximisation problem.
We ￿nd that quantity leadership in the downstream market tends to increase (decrease)
the incentives for the integrated unit (the upstream suppliers) to do research when com-
petition on the ￿nal market gets ￿ercer. Thus, when both the externality e⁄ect and the
degree of substitutability are very strong, the competitive advantage of the leader is so
strong that the outsiders are driven out of the market. In this case, we have a corner
solution where the upstream outsiders don￿ t produce research (see Appendix A.2.). This
is shown in Figure 4, where the reaction function of the upstream supplier, RO, is ￿ atterHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 18
Figure 4: Nash equilibrium research levels when both the externality e⁄ect and the degree
of substitutability are very strong
and lies below the reaction function of the merged units, RI. The equilibrium is at the
point at which the steeper reaction function cuts the horizontal axis; at this point the
independent upstream units don￿ t produce research; this in turn decreases the willingness
to pay for the products of the non-colluding downstream units to such a level that their
demand falls to zero.
Figure 5 shows the combinations of externality e⁄ect and degree of product di⁄eren-
tiation for which the non-integrated units are driven out of the market.
In our computations, we assumed that the costs to produce the input are so low with
respect to the research cost that they can be set equal to zero. This is however without loss
of generality: the results wouldn￿ t change if we assumed that there is a positive constant
cost of production per unit of input, (see Appendix A.2.).
Thus, when the integrated unit behaves as a Stackelberg leader with respect to its
downstream competitors, no subsequent merger will follow to an initial vertical merger,
if the products are close substitutes and the research spillover is su¢ ciently strong.
5. A downstream merger
In this section we consider the situation in which the initial merger is between two down-
stream units. More speci￿cally, assume that ￿rms 1 and 2 merge in the downstreamHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 19
Figure 5: At any point above the curve the non-integrated units are driven out of the
market
market; given our assumption of ￿rm-speci￿c input suppliers, the upstream ￿rms serving
￿rms 1 and 2 after the merger will both continue to serve the merged entity.
Assume also that the merger process increases the ability of the individual participants
to improve the quality of their ￿nal product, because of the presence of learning by doing
e⁄ects. We model this by assuming that the research e⁄ort of each plant-speci￿c input
supplier serving the participants spills over to the other participant. Suppose that the
magnitude of the spillover e⁄ect, a, is the same for both the participants. Thus, the
demands facing each individual participant are given by:
p1 = A + Bx1 + ax2 ￿ q1 ￿ b(q2 + q3)
p2 = A + Bx2 + ax1 ￿ q2 ￿ b(q1 + q3)
where 0 ￿ a ￿ 1
and in the post-merger game, the merged entity chooses q1 and q2 to maximise:
￿D(1;2) = (p1 ￿ w1)q1 + (p2 ￿ w2)q2Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 20
Figure 6: A downstream merger
while the other ￿rms continue to act independently and maximize:
￿D3 = (p3 ￿ w3)q3
￿U1 = w1q1 ￿ x2
1
￿U2 = w2q2 ￿ x2
2
￿U3 = w3q3 ￿ x2
3
For the sake of clarity, we o⁄er a diagram of the merger con￿guration, Figure 6.
This is a three-stage game with the following time structure:
- In stage 1, the independent input speci￿c suppliers choose the research e⁄ort, x;
- In the second stage, the same ￿rms set the input prices, w;
- In stage 3, the independent downstream unit and the merged entity compete in
quantities on the ￿nal market.Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 21
Solving the non-cooperative game by using backward induction, we ￿nd that this
merger is always pro￿table for the participating ￿rms and it is always more bene￿cial to
participate in a merger, rather than being an outsider. This is in accordance with the re-
sults found by Lommerud et al., (2003), who also consider a downstream merger between
two ￿rms served by ￿rm speci￿c input suppliers but in the absence of externality e⁄ects.
In their model, this happens because a merger induces the input suppliers of the par-
ticipants to set lower input prices; since the inputs are complements, also the outsider￿ s
input speci￿c supplier responds by setting a lower input price, though higher than for
the participants: this means that input prices are always lower for the participants and
this obviously contributes positively to the pro￿tability of a merger, thus eliminating any
incentive to free-ride. In our model, however, the driving force is the change in research
incentives induced by a merger; more speci￿cally, the participants bene￿t from a demand
enhancing externality e⁄ect that reduces (increases) the incentives for the outsider￿ s sup-
plier (participants￿suppliers) to decrease research (and input prices) when competition
on the ￿nal market gets ￿ercer.
Thus a downstream merger tends to induce more research from the supplier to the
downstream outsider, unless the products are strongly di⁄erentiated when the merger
induced externality is su¢ ciently strong; only in this case, the incentives to do research
are stronger for the suppliers to the merger￿ s participants. Higher research from the par-
ticipants￿suppliers will induce, (due to the research spillover and the merger induced
externality, a), stronger demand for the participants, thus allowing their input suppliers
to set higher prices for their inputs and earn positive pro￿ts. Since however the degree of
product di⁄erentiation is very high, competition on the ￿nal market is less ￿erce, and the
participants may compensate for higher costs of production with higher ￿nal prices with-
out su⁄ering signi￿cant demand losses. Because of the strategic substitutability between
research levels, the outsider￿ s input supplier will respond by decreasing its research e⁄ort;
lower research from the outsider￿ s supplier will in turn induce lower input demand fromHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 22
its customer thus leading the outsider￿ s supplier to set a lower input price. This means
that, when competition on the ￿nal market is less ￿erce, the downstream outsider faces
lower input prices but bene￿ts from lower research induced externality e⁄ects and this
su¢ ces to give the participants a merger advantage.
As the degree of substitutability increases, however, price competition on the ￿nal
market becomes ￿ercer, and all the suppliers will have incentives to reduce research, in
order to deliver lower input prices to their purchasers. These incentives however are
stronger for the participants￿suppliers; and the reason is that a reduction in research
intensity has a less strong negative impact on the input demand of the participants, who,
due to the merger, bene￿t from an additional demand enhancing externality e⁄ect. Thus
when the degree of product di⁄erentiation is not too strong, a merger will induce the
participants￿suppliers to decrease research and set lower input prices. Since research
levels are substitutes, the outsider￿ s supplier will now respond by increasing both research
and input price levels; this implies that when competition gets ￿ercer the outsider is faced
with worse price conditions only partially compensated by more intensive research activity
in the upstream market.
We now analyse the pro￿tability of this merger for the outsiders. To do that we have
to distinguish between high and low research/demand side spillover e⁄ects.
For 0 < B ￿ 0:5, mergers are pro￿table for the independent downstream ￿rm at any
point between the two branches of Figure 7 ; for 0:5 < B ￿ 1, mergers are pro￿table at
any point below the curve in Figure 8. Thus if the horizontal merger induced externality
is not too strong, mergers of this kind are always pro￿table for the downstream outsider
only if the products are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated. This is not surprising if we consider that
the outsider faces worse price conditions when competition on the ￿nal market becomes
￿ercer. When the research spillover, B, is not too strong, the incentives for the outsider￿ s
supplier to reduce research, as both b and a increase, are weaker; this means that as
the degree of product di⁄erentiation decreases, the outsider will face higher input pricesHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 23
Figure 7: Merger pro￿tability for the independent downstream ￿rm, B = 0:3
Figure 8: Merger pro￿tability for the independent downstream ￿rm, B = 1
but, given the weakness of the research spillover, only modest research induced demand
increases.
When the research spillover is su¢ ciently strong, the incentives for the outsider￿ s
supplier to reduce research are stronger; in this case, the outsider faces slightly lower
input prices that positively contribute to their pro￿tability when price competition be-
comes ￿ercer. Since however now the participants bene￿t from stronger research induced
demand increases, mergers may be pro￿table for the downstream outsider only if the
merger induced externality is su¢ ciently weak.Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 24
Figure 9: Merger pro￿tability for the upstream outsider serving the independent down-
stream ￿rm, B = 0:3
If we now turn to analyse the pro￿tability of this merger for the ￿rms operating in the
upstream market, we can observe that this merger is always pro￿table for the supplier to
the downstream outsider unless the merger induced externality is su¢ ciently strong when
the degree of product di⁄erentiation is very low, Figures 9 ￿ 10; in this case in fact the
incentives to increase research for the outsider￿ s supplier are still enough weak. When the
products are close substitutes and the merger induced e⁄ect is weak, the input price of
the outsider￿ s supplier tends to increase while its research activity tends to decrease; this
in turn decreases the demand of the downstream outsider and therefore the pro￿tability
of the input supplier.
Mergers of this type are pro￿table for the upstream ￿rms serving the merged entity only
if the merger induced externality and the degree of product di⁄erentiation are su¢ ciently
strong, Figures 11 and 12. According to the existing literature, with plant-speci￿c input
suppliers, mergers of this type are always unpro￿table for the suppliers to the merged
entity: as a result of a downstream merger in fact the input demands become more
price responsive, thus inducing the suppliers to set lower input prices. A downstream
merger also induces a reduction of output and therefore of input demand from the merged
￿rms. If the degree of product di⁄erentiation however is very strong (thus implying weakerHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 25
Figure 10: Merger pro￿tability for the upstream outsider serving the independent down-
stream ￿rm, B = 1
responses from the outsiders), when there are positive merger induced externalities (which
tend to counteract the merger induced reduction in the output for the merged unit),
these e⁄ects tend to be softened thus allowing the input suppliers to make gains from the
merger. As competition on the ￿nal market gets ￿ercer the incentives to decrease research
are stronger for the participants￿suppliers; thus demand tends to decrease more for the
insiders and only stronger merger induced externalities may counteract this e⁄ect.
It may be interesting to observe that under this merger con￿guration, when the inte-
grated units behave as Stackelberg leaders with respect to their competitor, the outsiders
are never driven out of the market. This happens because as competition on the ￿nal
market becomes ￿ercer the supplier to the downstream outsider is induced to decrease
research less than the participants￿suppliers.
6. Other merger configurations
The main purpose of this section is to investigate which alternative merger con￿gurations
may emerge in response to an initial vertical merger. We consider four possible scenarios:
￿ following a vertical merger, all the outsiders respond by integrating vertically. This
leads to a new merger con￿guration in which the initial merged units are worse o⁄.Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 26
Figure 11: Merger pro￿tability for the upstream outsiders serving the merged unit, B =
0:3
Figure 12: Merger pro￿tability for the upstream outsiders serving the merged ￿rms, B = 1Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 27
If however the products are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated and the research spillovers are
not too strong, all the units are better o⁄ with respect to a pre-merger situation; in
this case the initial merged units would still have incentives to integrate vertically
￿ following a vertical merger, the downstream outsiders respond by merging. In this
scenario mergers are always pro￿table for the initial merged units and likely to be
pro￿table for the downstream participants. Since however this merger con￿guration
may further reduce the pro￿tability of the suppliers to the downstream participants,
we also consider the case in which
￿ following a vertical merger, both the downstream and upstream outsiders respond
by horizontally integrating. This new merger con￿guration while being extremely
unfavourable for the downstream participants doesn￿ t signi￿cantly improve the prof-
itability of the upstream participants. Thus both the merged units might have
incentives to integrate vertically. This leads to a new merger con￿guration where
￿ all the units are integrated vertically but the initial downstream outsiders are also
integrated horizontally. In this case the only element of di⁄erentiation between the
participants is the merger induced externality. Thus the problem reduces to the
analysis of the e⁄ects of a horizontal merger when there are merger induced gains
and all the players face identical cost conditions. It is well known from the literature
that, in the absence of spillovers, mergers of this type are always more pro￿table
for the outsiders, Salant et al., (1983), Deneckere and Davidson, (1985). Thus the
strength of the research spillover will be decisive in determining which players earn
more.
6.1. Three vertical mergers. Consider now a situation in which, following the initial
vertical merger, the outsiders respond by vertically integrating. In this case a completely
integrated structure emerges, Figure 13, where the initial merged units are worse o⁄. IfHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 28
Figure 13: Three vertical mergers
however the products are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated and the research spillover is not too
strong, all the units are better o⁄ with respect to a pre-merger situation.
The objective function of the individual post-merger unit in this case is given by:
￿iV =
0







for i = 1;2;3.
Each integrated entity thus chooses quantity and research e⁄ort so as to maximise
individual pro￿t levels given the quantity and research decisions of the other integrated
units. Solving backwards the two stage game, we ￿nd that both research and quantity
levels are higher than when ￿rms act independently. The internalisation of the pricing
externality in fact lowers the cost for the integrated units, who may now set lower prices
and devote more resources to research, with positive e⁄ects on their ￿nal demand.
These mergers are pro￿table if ￿iV > ￿C
iD+￿C
iU. In Figure 14, we show the locus of the
points for which ￿iV = ￿C
iD + ￿C
iU. At any point below this locus mergers are pro￿table.
Notice that this happens only for very low degrees of substitutability and if the ability
of the ￿rms to transform the intermediate good into a higher quality ￿nal product is notHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 29
too strong. Notice also that in the absence of research spillovers the pro￿tability of such
mergers would always be positive for b < 0:35. Thus the presence of research induced
externality e⁄ects tends to decrease the pro￿tability of vertical integration.
The intuition behind these results is simple. Due to the internalisation of the pricing
externality, the integrated units face better cost conditions that decrease their incen-
tives to do research when competition on the ￿nal market gets ￿ercer. Stronger research
spillovers tend to increase the competitive advantage of the integrated units and therefore
to reinforce these incentives.
We ￿rst notice that, when the products are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated, competition on
the ￿nal market is less ￿erce and this allows the input suppliers to set higher input prices
and research e⁄orts. When instead the products are less di⁄erentiated, input demands are
more responsive to input prices and the input suppliers are induced to set lower prices and
therefore to decrease research. This means that, as the degree of product di⁄erentiation
decreases, the gains from the internalisation of the pricing externality tend to decrease
and this changes the incentives to do research for the integrated units. When competition
is less ￿erce, the cost advantage of the integrated units is stronger and lower research
intensity has a stronger negative impact on the demand of the independent units, who
therefore, following an increase in competition, will decrease their research e⁄ort by less.
When however competition becomes ￿ercer, the gains from the internalisation of the pric-
ing externality are smaller and this induces the integrated units to respond by increasing
their research activity. Thus the incentives to reduce research for the integrated units are
stronger when competition on the ￿nal market is less ￿erce and weaker when the gains
from the internalisation of the pricing externality get smaller; this means that research
and therefore demand decrease more for the integrated units when they face better cost
conditions and this su¢ ces to erode their competitive advantage when competition gets
￿ercer.Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 30
Figure 14: Merger pro￿tability of vertical mergers
Figure 15: Vertical and downstream horizontal mergers
6.2. Vertical and downstream horizontal mergers. Consider now a situation in
which in response to an initial vertical merger, the downstream outsiders respond by
merging, Figure 15.
The pro￿ts of the post-merger units may be expressed as:
￿V 1 = (A + Bx1 ￿ q1 ￿ b(q2 + q3))q1 ￿ x2
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￿D(2;3) = (A + Bx2 + ax3 ￿ q2 ￿ b(q1 + q3) ￿ w2)q2+(A + Bx3 + ax2 ￿ q3 ￿ b(q1 + q2) ￿ w3)q3
while the upstream outsiders continue to act independently:
￿U2 = w2q2 ￿ x2
2
￿U3 = w3q3 ￿ x2
3
In the ￿rst stage of the game, the vertically integrated unit and the independent input
suppliers set research; in the second stage the suppliers to the downstream merged units
set input prices; in the last stage of the game the integrated units compete in quantities.
In this context, the initial merged unit still bene￿ts from the internalisation of both the
input price and the research spillover and may therefore increase research with positive
e⁄ects on its ￿nal demand and pro￿tability. The downstream merged units instead bene￿t
from a merger induced externality that, though reinforcing the positive e⁄ect of research on
their ￿nal demand, tends to decrease the incentives for their suppliers to do research when
competition on the ￿nal market gets ￿ercer. Thus research and demand tend to decrease
for the downstream participants, unless the merger induced externality is su¢ ciently
strong when the products are strongly di⁄erentiated. In this case, stronger merger induced
externalities induce more research also from the suppliers to the downstream participants
and this obviously contributes positively to the pro￿tability not only of the downstream
units but also of their input suppliers, who may now set higher input prices.
When however the degree of product di⁄erentiation decreases, competition on the
￿nal market gets ￿ercer and the upstream suppliers reduce their research intensity while
the vertically integrated unit, internalising the research spillover, intensi￿es its research
activity; thus demand decreases for the downstream participants and increases for the
integrated unit. This su¢ ces to make these mergers always pro￿table for the initialHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 32
Figure 16: Merger pro￿tability for the downstream participants and their suppliers, B =
0:3
integrated unit. Whether the downstream participants earn or lose with respect to a
pre-merger situation, it will depend instead upon the strength of the research spillover:
if the research spillover is su¢ ciently weak, the incentives for the upstream suppliers
(vertically integrated unit) to decrease (increase) research are weaker and mergers are
always pro￿table for the downstream participants, Figure 16. When instead the research
spillover is su¢ ciently strong, the upstream suppliers (vertically integrated unit) have
stronger incentives to decrease (increase) research and mergers may be pro￿table for the
downstream participants only for su¢ ciently strong horizontal merger induced e⁄ects and
if the products are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated, Figure 17.
6.3. Vertical and downstream/upstream mergers. We now consider a situation
in which, following an initial vertical merger, both the downstream and upstream outsiders
respond by integrating horizontally. This is a reasonable reaction if we consider that
a downstream merger is likely to be unpro￿table for the suppliers to the downstream
participants. In Figure 18, we provide a representation of this new merger con￿guration.
In this new context, the post merger pro￿ts are:Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 33
Figure 17: Merger pro￿tability for the downstream participants and their suppliers, B = 1
Figure 18: Vertical and downstream/upstream mergersHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 34
￿V 1 = (A + Bx1 ￿ q1 ￿ b(q2 + q3))q1 ￿ x2
1
￿D(2;3) = (A + Bx2 + ax3 ￿ q2 ￿ b(q1 + q3) ￿ w2)q2+(A + Bx3 + ax2 ￿ q3 ￿ b(q1 + q2) ￿ w3)q3
￿U(2;3) = w2q2 ￿ x2
2 + w3q3 ￿ x2
3
In the third stage of the game the vertically integrated unit and the downstream
merged units set quantities so as to maximise pro￿ts; in the second stage, the upstream
merged units, given the candidate equilibrium quantities, set input prices; ￿nally, in the
￿rst stage, knowing the candidate equilibrium quantities and input prices, the upstream
participants and the vertically integrated unit choose the pro￿t maximising level of re-
search.
In this context, mergers are always pro￿table for the initial integrated unit. As in the
previous scenario, in fact, the internalisation of the pricing externality creates a cost ad-
vantage for the vertically integrated units that allows them to pro￿tably increase research.
The downstream merged units bene￿t as before from an additional demand enhancing ex-
ternality that however reduces the incentives for their now merged suppliers to do research
when competition on the ￿nal market gets ￿ercer. An important di⁄erence with respect
to the previous merger con￿guration is that now the research activity of the suppliers to
the downstream participants is higher; this is due to the internalisation of the research
spillover induced by an upstream merger, that tends to increase the research activity of
its participants. Since however now the upstream suppliers coordinate their price and re-
search decisions, their downstream customers cannot shift production between their two
goods to induce ￿ercer price competition and therefore lower input prices from their sup-
pliers. Thus input prices tend to increase more than justi￿ed by the increase in research
and this obviously contributes positively to the pro￿tability of the upstream merged unitsHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 35
Figure 19: Merger pro￿tability for the downstream and upstream participants, B = 0:3
but tends to decrease the pro￿tability of the downstream participants. This is shown
in Figures 19 and 20, where, for both weak and strong research spillovers, mergers are
pro￿table for the downstream participants only for su¢ ciently strong values of both the
merger induced externality and the degree of product di⁄erentiation. It may be also inter-
esting to observe that in contrast to the previous merger con￿guration, stronger research
spillovers tend now to increase the pro￿tability of both the downstream and upstream
participants, Figure 20; this happens because, by internalising the research spillover, an
upstream merger induces its participants to increase research as the research spillover gets
stronger.
6.4. Vertical and horizontal integration. We now consider the case in which in
response to a vertical merger, the downstream merged units vertically integrate with their
speci￿c input suppliers.
The merger con￿guration is given in Figure 21. With respect to the previous scenario,
where the downstream merged units were in a position of clear disadvantage, when all
the units integrate vertically, the only element of di⁄erentiation is the merger induced
externality. Thus the problem reduces to the analysis of the e⁄ects of a horizontal merger
when there are merger induced gains and when all the players face identical cost conditions.Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 36
Figure 20: Merger pro￿tability for the downstream and upstream participants, B = 1
Figure 21: Vertical and horizontal integration
It is well known from the literature that when ￿rms compete in quantities and there are
no e¢ ciency gains, horizontal mergers are always pro￿table for the outsiders and may
be pro￿table for the participants only if the products are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated. We
will show that the presence of a merger induced externality e⁄ect, by limiting the supply
response of the outsider, may make these mergers more pro￿table for the participants.
In this context, the integrated units set research and quantity levels to maximise their
individual pro￿ts; these are given by:Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 37
￿V 1 = p1q1 ￿ x2
1
￿V (2;3) = p2q2 + p3q3 ￿ x2
2 ￿ x2
3
This is a two stage game between two vertically integrated entities, which presents
the following time structure: in stage 1, the two merged units choose simultaneously and
independently the research levels, x1;x2 and x3; in stage 2, the two merged units choose
simultaneously and independently the quantity levels, q1and q2, q3.
Solving the model by backward induction, we ￿nd that, for su¢ ciently strong research
spillovers, B ￿ B￿and a 6= a￿, we have a corner solution where the initial integrated unit
doesn￿ t produce research and is driven out of the market, (see Appendix A.7.).
For B ￿ B￿, all the units produce research and the relative merger pro￿tability de-
pends on the strength of the merger induced e⁄ect, a.
Figure 22 shows that, in the absence of research spillovers, these mergers are pro￿table
for the new merged units only if the products are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated, if b ￿ 0:363.
For b > 0:363, these mergers may be pro￿table for the new merged units only if the merger
induced externality e⁄ect is su¢ ciently strong; for stronger research spillovers, however,
lower merger induced externalities may guarantee a positive pro￿tability, Figure 23.
In the absence of research spillovers, mergers of this type are always pro￿table for the
initial vertically integrated unit; when there are research induced spillovers instead these
mergers are pro￿table only if the merger induced externality is su¢ ciently weak, Figure
24. Notice also that stronger research spillovers must be compensated by weaker merger
induced e⁄ects, for this merger to be pro￿table for the initial integrated unit, Figure 25.
Thus, mergers of this type are more pro￿table for the new merged units if the merger
induced externality and the ability of ￿rms to transform the input into a higher quality
product are su¢ ciently strong. The intuition behind these results is very simple: due toHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 38
Figure 22: Merger pro￿tability for the new merged units, B = 0:3
Figure 23: Merger pro￿tability for the new merged units, B = 1
Figure 24: Merger pro￿tability for the initial integrated unit, B = 0:3Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 39
Figure 25: Merger pro￿tability for the initial integrated unit, B = 1
the internalisation of the research spillover induced by vertical integration, both the units
increase research. Since however the horizontally integrated units also bene￿t from an
additional demand enhancing externality, the incentives for these units to do research are
di⁄erent.
For very low values of the horizontal merger induced externality, the horizontally in-
tegrated units produce more research than the initial integrated unit only if the products
are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated; for stronger values of the merger induced e⁄ect, instead,
research levels are always higher for the new merged units. As the degree of substitutabil-
ity increases, however, the incentives to reduce research are always stronger for the new
merged units; thus demand tends to decrease more for these units and only stronger
merger induced spillovers may counteract this e⁄ect. Stronger research spillovers, B, tend
to induce more research and thus are more bene￿cial to the new integrated units, while an
increase in the degree of substitutability induces less research from the horizontal merged
units, thus resulting more bene￿cial to the initial integrated unit. Further, for su¢ ciently
strong externality e⁄ects, the initial integrated unit may be driven out of the market when
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7. Subsequent mergers
In this section we investigate which merger con￿gurations are likely to emerge in response
to an initial horizontal merger in the downstream market.
As shown in section 5, a downstream merger may be unpro￿table for the participants￿
suppliers, who may therefore have incentives to react by coordinating their price and re-
search decisions. This would lead to a new merger con￿guration, in which the downstream
participants may be worse o⁄. Anticipating this, the downstream participants might try
to integrate vertically to preempt a horizontal merger between their input speci￿c sup-
pliers. A merger of this type however would reduce the pro￿tability of the outsiders and
provide them too with incentives to integrate vertically. In this section, we brie￿ y analyse
these new merger con￿gurations.
7.1. Downstream and upstream mergers. We consider a situation in which, in
response to a downstream merger, the input speci￿c suppliers of the merged entity react by
merging. We will show that this type of merger reduces the pro￿tability of the downstream
participants and may provide both the upstream and the downstream merged units with
incentives to integrate vertically. In Figure 26, we provide a representation of this merger
con￿guration.
In this situation, the post-merger downstream and upstream units respectively max-
imise:
￿D(1;2) = (p1 ￿ w1)q1 + (p2 ￿ w2)q2
￿U(1;2) = w1q1 + w2q2 ￿ x2
1 ￿ x2
2
while the other ￿rms continue to act independently and maximise:
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Figure 26: Downstream and upstream mergers
￿U3 = w3q3 ￿ x2
3
This is a three stage game with the following time structure:
In stage 1, the upstream units, the merged units and the independent unit, choose
simultaneously and independently the research levels, x1;x2 and x3.
In stage 2, the same units choose simultaneously and independently the input prices,
w1;w2 and w3.
In stage 3, the downstream units, the merged entity and the independent unit, choose
simultaneously and independently quantity levels, q1;q2 and q3.
Solving the model by backward induction, we ￿nd that these mergers are pro￿table
for the downstream participants and their suppliers only if both the externality e⁄ects
and the degree of product di⁄erentiation are su¢ ciently strong, Figures 27 and 28 .
The intuition for this result may be better understood by considering how this merger
a⁄ects the research (and price) decisions of the suppliers to the downstream participants.
We ￿rst notice that because of the internalisation of the research spillover induced by
an upstream merger, research for the upstream participants is now always higher than for
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the incentives for the upstream participants to increase research depend on the strength
of the merger induced externality, a. For low values of a, the upstream participants
produce more research only when the products are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated. In this case,
lower degrees of product di⁄erentiation makes competition on the ￿nal market ￿ercer
and this leads all the input suppliers to decrease research. Since however the downstream
participants bene￿t from an additional demand enhancing externality e⁄ect, the incentives
to reduce research are stronger for their suppliers; thus research and therefore demand
decrease more for the downstream participants and this obviously negatively contributes
to their pro￿tability. Stronger merger induced externalities tend to increase the research
e⁄ort of the upstream participants, with respect to a pre-merger situation, but don￿ t alter
the incentives for these ￿rms to decrease research when competition on the ￿nal market
gets ￿ercer; thus, also in this case, the supplier to the downstream outsider will have weaker
incentives to reduce research. The change in research incentives induced by a merger
has also important implications on the input prices. Following a merger, equilibrium
input prices increase for both the insiders and the outsider, but the downstream merged
units face higher input prices than their rival. The interesting feature is that even if
the upstream participants have stronger incentives to reduce research when competition
becomes ￿ercer, lower research from these ￿rms doesn￿ t induce a corresponding decrease
in input prices; thus input prices tend to decrease less than research and this negatively
contributes to the pro￿tability of the downstream participants. The intuition behind this
result is very simple: now the upstream suppliers are coordinating their price decisions
and therefore the downstream participants cannot shift production between their two
goods to induce lower input prices from their suppliers.
We have seen that with respect to the situation in which only two downstream ￿rms
merge, the upstream ￿rms are better o⁄ if they respond by merging; this reaction how-
ever is likely to reduce the pro￿tability of the downstream units, while not signi￿cantly
improving the pro￿tability of their suppliers. We therefore wonder whether it might beHorizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 43
Figure 27: Merger pro￿tability for the downstream and upstream participants, B = 0:3
Figure 28: Merger pro￿tability for the upstream and downstream participants, B = 1Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 44
Figure 29: Downstream mergers and vertical integration
pro￿table for the two separated merged entities to vertically integrate.
7.2. Downstream mergers and vertical integration. In this section we consider
the case in which the downstream merged units integrate vertically with their input speci￿c
suppliers. A graphical representation of this merger con￿guration is o⁄ered in Figure 29.
In section 4, we have shown that one vertical merger between one downstream unit and its
input speci￿c supplier is always pro￿table for the participants but always unpro￿table for
the ￿rms left out. We will now show that when both horizontal and vertical integration
are feasible, these results are reinforced: not only mergers are always pro￿table for the
participants, but if the externality e⁄ects are su¢ ciently strong when the products are
close substitutes the outsiders may be driven out of the market. In this new context,
in fact, mergers give rise to two di⁄erent gains: a demand enhancing e⁄ect, induced by
the merger in the downstream market, and the internalisation of the pricing externality,
induced by the vertical integration of the downstream merged units with their suppliers.
The problem of the post-merger entity is to maximise:
￿V (1;2) = p1q1 + p2q2 ￿ x2
1 ￿ x2
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where:
p1 = A + Bx1 + ax2 ￿ q1 ￿ b(q2 + q3) (2)
p2 = A + Bx2 + ax1 ￿ q2 ￿ b(q1 + q3) (3)
while the other ￿rms continue to act independently. The independent downstream
￿rm maximises:
￿D3 = (p3 ￿ w3)q3
with
p3 = A + Bx3 ￿ q3 ￿ b(q1 + q2) (4)
while its input speci￿c supplier maximises:
￿U3 = w3q3 ￿ x2
3
This is a three stage game with the following time structure:
In the ￿rst stage, the independent upstream ￿rm and the integrated unit choose si-
multaneously and independently the level of research so as to maximise pro￿ts; in the
second stage, the independent upstream ￿rm chooses the input price for its purchaser;
and ￿nally, in the third stage, the integrated unit and the independent downstream ￿rm
set quantities.
Solving the model by backward induction, we ￿nd that only the equilibrium variables
of the merged entity are increasing in the merger-induced externality, a. The e⁄ect of an
increase in B is more ambiguous: research activity increases for both the units, but more
for the participants; this has a positive e⁄ect on the individual demands but a negative
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Figure 30: At any point above the curve, the outsiders are driven out of the market,
B ￿ 0:9
This merger has two positive e⁄ects on the pro￿tability of the participants: the inter-
nalisation of the input cost and the externality e⁄ect arising from the horizontal merger.
As a result, research activity and demand increase for the participants and fall for the
outsider. Thus it is not surprising to ￿nd that mergers of this type are always pro￿table
for the participants and always unpro￿table for the outsiders, regardless of the external-
ity e⁄ect and of the ability of the downstream units to transform the input into a higher
quality product.
Further if the research spillover is su¢ ciently strong, we have a corner solution where
the upstream outsider doesn￿ t produce research and both the upstream and the down-
stream outsiders are driven out of the market. In Figure 30, we show that this happens
only if both the research spillover and the merger induced externality are very strong
when the products are close substitutes; for the special case in which B = a = 1, instead,
the outsiders are always driven out of the market, Figure 31.
Since however now the outsiders are in a position of clear disadvantage, they might
have incentives to respond by integrating vertically. This leads to the merger con￿guration
analysed in section 6:4, where the relative pro￿tability for the participants depends on
the strength of the horizontal merger induced externality e⁄ect.Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 47
Figure 31: At any point above the curve, the outsiders are driven out of the market,
B = 1
8. Equilibrium merger configurations
Following an initial vertical merger, two possible merger con￿gurations might emerge: a
situation where all the units integrate vertically or a situation where all the units inter-
nalise the pricing externality but two downstream units also integrate horizontally. This
second merger con￿guration is likely to emerge also in response to an initial downstream
merger.
Anticipating the reactions of the non-merging ￿rms, would the ￿rst downstream par-
ticipant prefer to vertically integrate with its input supplier or to horizontally integrate
with another downstream unit?
In tables 1, 2 and 3, we show, for di⁄erent values of the parameters of the model, the
individual equilibrium pro￿ts for the benchmark model, ￿C
U and ￿C
D, and the two possible
equilibrium merger con￿gurations: more speci￿cally, ￿V (i;j), with i;j = 1;2;3, i 6= j,
denotes the pro￿t of the horizontally and vertically integrated downstream units while
￿V k, with k = 1;2;3 and k 6= i;j, re￿ ects the pro￿t of the unique vertically integrated
unit; ￿nally ￿V denotes the individual equilibrium pro￿t for the case of complete vertical
integration. The values in brackets re￿ ect the average merger pro￿tability for each possible
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When the products are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated our results are that:
￿ for weak externality e⁄ects, vertical integration is more pro￿table for the initial
merged units. In this case the outsiders would respond by internalising the pricing
externality and integrating horizontally in the downstream market. Thus complete
vertical integration would never be an equilibrium outcome
￿ for strong research spillovers, horizontal integration is more pro￿table for the initial
merged units. In this case the outsiders would be always harmed by the initial
merger and for su¢ ciently strong merger induced externality e⁄ects they would be
driven out of the market.
When instead the products are close substitutes, we ￿nd that:
￿ for low externality e⁄ects, vertical integration is always better for the initial merged
units; in this scenario, however, the outsiders would respond by integrating vertically
and all the ￿rms would be worse o⁄ with respect to a pre-merger situation. In this
context the initial merger might not be carried through
￿ for very strong research spillovers and weak merger induced e⁄ects, vertical inte-
gration should prevail over horizontal integration; in this case, the outsiders would
respond by internalising the pricing externality and by horizontally integrating in
the downstream market. If however the initial merged units were able to identify the
reaction functions of the outsiders and to lead them accordingly, no further merger
would follow. In this case, in fact, the outsiders would be driven out of the market
￿ for strong research spillovers and merger induced e⁄ects, horizontal integration is
more pro￿table for the initial merged units; in this scenario, the outsiders would be
harmed or driven out of the market
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￿ for low externality e⁄ects, vertical integration is always better for the initial merged
units; in this case, however, the outsiders to minimise their losses would respond by
horizontally integrating in the downstream market and by internalising the pricing
externality
￿ for very strong research spillovers, horizontal integration is always more pro￿table
for the initial merged units; in this context, however, the outsiders would be always
harmed.
Thus when both horizontal and vertical integration are feasible, complete vertical
integration should never be an equilibrium outcome.
Table 1 - Equilibrium merger con￿gurations, b = 0:3
b B a ￿C
U ￿C
D ￿V (i;j) ￿V k ￿V
0:3 0:3 0:1 :095 :050 :306 (.004) :160 (.007) :150 (.002)
0:3 0:3 0:3 :095 :050 :320 (.008) :156 (.006) :150 (.002)
0:3 1:0 0:3 :103 :062 :419 (.022) :164 (-.001) :169 (.002)
0:3 1:0 0:6 :103 :062 :587 (.064) :114 (-.025) :169 (.002)
0:3 1:0 0:9 :103 :062 1:14 (.202) :015 (-.075) :169 (.002)
Table 2 - Equilibrium merger con￿gurations, b = 0:9
b B a ￿C
U ￿C
D ￿V (i;j) ￿V k ￿V
0:9 0:3 0:1 :052 :037 :129 (-.012) :112 (.011) :068 (-.010)
0:9 0:3 0:3 :052 :037 :135 (-.011) :107 (.009) :068 (-.010)
0:9 1:0 0:3 :054 :044 :119 (-.019) :116 (.009) :054 (-.022)
0:9 1:0 0:6 :054 :044 :206 (.003) :046 (-.026) :054 (-.022)
0:9 1:0 0:9 :054 :044 :252 (.014) :000 (.000) :054 (-.022)
Table 3 - Equilibrium merger con￿gurations, b = 0:5
b B a ￿C
U ￿C
D ￿V (i;j) ￿V k ￿V
0:5 0:3 0:1 :079 :044 :228 (-.004) :132 (.005) :112 (-.005)
0:5 0:3 0:3 :079 :044 :237 (-.002) :128 (.003) :112 (-.005)
0:5 1:0 0:3 :084 :054 :285 (.002) :128 (-.005) :116 (-.011)
0:5 1:0 0:6 :084 :054 :401 (.031) :076 (-.031) :116 (-.011)
0:5 1:0 0:9 :084 :054 :777 (.125) :001 (-.068) :116 (-.011)
9. Conclusions
We have examined how the presence of research activity in the upstream market may a⁄ect
the pro￿tability of di⁄erent types of mergers. We have also investigated how an initial
merger may create incentives for the non-merging ￿rms to respond with a countermerger.
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and we showed that, when considered in isolation, these mergers are always pro￿table for
the participants. Thus there are always incentives for the ￿rst two units to merge. When
the initial merger is between one downstream unit and its input speci￿c supplier, all the
outsiders are harmed and have therefore incentives to react by merging in turn. If all the
units integrate vertically, then the initial participants are worse o⁄ but, if the products
are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated and the research spillover is not too strong, the pro￿ts of
the industry as a whole increase and all the units are better o⁄ with respect to a pre-
merger situation. When however both vertical and horizontal integration are feasible, the
outsiders might consider to respond with alternative mergers; more speci￿cally, we have
shown that the outsiders would be better o⁄ by both internalising the pricing externality
and integrating horizontally in the downstream market, unless the products are close
substitutes when the externality e⁄ects are weak. In this case however complete vertical
integration would be unpro￿table for all the units and the initial merger might not be
carried through.
We have also shown that an initial merger between two downstream competitors, while
being pro￿table for its participants, is likely to create incentives for their suppliers to re-
spond with a countermerger. This new merger, while reducing the pro￿tability of the
downstream participants, doesn￿ t improve signi￿cantly the pro￿tability of their suppliers.
Anticipating this, the downstream participants might try to integrate vertically to pre-
empt a merger between their suppliers. In this new merger con￿guration, however, the
outsiders would be in a position of clear disadvantage and would therefore have incentives
to respond by vertically integrating. This leads to the last merger con￿guration where
all the units internalise the pricing externality but the initial participants also bene￿t
from an additional merger induced e⁄ect. For su¢ ciently strong externalities, the ini-
tial participants always earn more and horizontal integration should prevail over vertical
integration.
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strong, horizontal integration is always more pro￿table for the initial merged units; when
instead the merger induced externality is weak, the initial merged units might earn more
by integrating vertically. In both scenarios, however, complete vertical integration is never
an equilibrium outcome when both horizontal and vertical integration are feasible.
It might also be interesting to investigate which equilibrium structures are likely to
emerge when ￿rms in each period may decide whether to form new links or break existing
links. An attempt in this direction has been made by Gowrisankaran, (1996), who, us-
ing numerical simulations, examines how a merger decision may a⁄ect subsequent entry
decisions in a model where merging, entry/exit and production choices are made in each
period.
We feel that this issue needs further investigation and this is part of our future research
agenda.
To check the robustness of our results we repeated the same analysis for the case of
price competition on the ￿nal market. While our main results still hold, there are however
some interesting di⁄erences related to the presence of an additional strategic e⁄ect: when
￿rms compete in prices, the rivals￿suppliers research activity has a direct negative e⁄ect
on the individual ￿nal demands, which tends to intensify the research activity of all the
input suppliers when competition on the ￿nal market gets ￿ercer. Since the incentives to
increase research are stronger for the suppliers to the outsiders, mergers are pro￿table for
the participants for a lower set of parameter values.
Another relevant question is whether our results are related to the assumption of
linear production technologies and demands. For the case of vertical integration the
question has been investigated by Abiru, (1988), who shows how the welfare e⁄ects of
vertical integration do not change with di⁄erent assumptions on production technology
and market structure. For the case of horizontal integration, instead, the problem is far
from being fully investigated, maybe because very little may be said on the issue unless
speci￿c functional forms are used. Most of the earlier work, however, Salant et al., (1983),Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 52
Deneckere and Davidson, (1985), Perry and Porter, (1985), Lommerud et al., (2003), is
based on linear demand functions.
A. Appendix: equilibrium outcomes
A.1. One vertical merger. Solving the ￿rst order conditions of the pro￿ts with




A(2 ￿ b) ￿ bB(x2 + x3) + B(b + 2)x1 + b(w2 + w3)




A(2 ￿ b) ￿ bB(x1 + x3) + B(b + 2)x2 + bw3 ￿ w2(b + 2)




A(2 ￿ b) ￿ bB(x1 + x2) + B(b + 2)x3 + bw2 ￿ w3(b + 2)
b + 2 ￿ b2
Given the equilibrium quantities, the independent upstream units choose their input
prices so as to maximise their individual pro￿ts; these are given by:
w2 =
A(2b + 8 ￿ 3b2) + B(b2 + 8b + 8)x3 ￿ bB(b + 2)x2 ￿ bB(3b + 4)x1
3b2 + 16b + 16
w3 =
A(2b + 8 ￿ 3b2) + B(b2 + 8b + 8)x2 ￿ bB(b + 2)x3 ￿ bB(3b + 4)x1
3b2 + 16b + 16
Finally by substituting the candidate equilibrium quantities and input prices into the
pro￿ts of the integrated unit and of the independent suppliers, the equilibrium research
e⁄orts may be found solving the ￿rst order conditions with respect to the research activity:
xV 1 = ￿AB(b2 ￿ 6b ￿ 8)
￿
(b + 2)(b2 + 8b + 8)B2 + (b + 4)(b ￿ 2)(3b + 4)2￿
=G
xU2 = xU3 = ￿AB(b + 2)(b2 + 8b + 8)
￿
(b2 ￿ 6b ￿ 8)B2 + 2(b + 4)(b + 1)(b ￿ 2)2￿
=G
where
G = (b + 2)(b2 + 8b + 8)(b2 ￿ 6b ￿ 8)B4 ￿ 4(3b + 4)(b + 1)2(b ￿ 2)2(b + 4)3 +
￿(b + 4)(b5 + 68b4 + 36b3 ￿ 480b2 ￿ 832b ￿ 384)B2
is always negative for B ￿ 1
Hence the equilibrium quantity, input price and pro￿t levels are:
qV 1 = ￿2A(b + 4)(b ￿ 2)(b + 1)
￿
(b + 2)(b2 + 8b + 8)B2 + (b + 4)(b ￿ 2)(3b + 4)2￿
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qD2 = qD3 = ￿A(b + 4)(3b + 4)(b + 2)
￿
(b2 ￿ 6b ￿ 8)B2 + 2(b + 4)(b + 1)(b ￿ 2)2￿
=G
w2 = w3 = 2A(b ￿ 2)(3b + 4)(b + 4)(b + 1)
￿
(b2 ￿ 6b ￿ 8)B2 + 2(b + 4)(b + 1)(b ￿ 2)2￿
=G
￿V 1 = ￿A2G2
1
￿
(b2 ￿ 6b ￿ 8)B + 2(b + 4)(b ￿ 2)(b + 1)
￿￿
(6b ￿ b2 + 8)B + 2(b + 4)(b ￿ 2)(b + 1)
￿
=G2
￿D2 = ￿D3 = A2(b+4)2(3b+4)2(b+2)2 ￿
(b2 ￿ 6b ￿ 8)B2 + 2(b + 4)(b + 1)(b ￿ 2)2￿2
=G2
￿U2 = ￿U3 = ￿A2G2(b + 2)
￿
(b2 ￿ 6b ￿ 8)B2 + 2(b + 4)(b + 1)(b ￿ 2)2￿2
=G2
where:
G1 = (b + 2)(b2 + 8b + 8)B2 + (b + 4)(b ￿ 2)(3b + 4)2
G2 = (b + 2)(b2 + 8b + 8)2B2 + 2(b + 1)(b ￿ 2)(b + 4)2(3b + 4)2 < 0
A.2. Stackelberg Oligopoly. The problem of the integrated unit is to maximise
max
q1
￿1 = (A + Bx1 ￿ q1 ￿ b(R2(q1) + R3(q1)))q1 ￿ x2
1 (5)
where R2(q1), R3(q1) denote the reaction functions of the non-colluding ￿rms
R2(q1) =
(2x2 ￿ bx3)B + (2 ￿ b)A + (b2 ￿ 2b)q1 ￿ 2w2 + bw3
4 ￿ b2 (6)
R3(q1) =
(2x3 ￿ bx2)B + (2 ￿ b)A + (b2 ￿ 2b)q1 + bw2 ￿ 2w3
4 ￿ b2 (7)
Di⁄erentiating (5) with respect to q1 and solving the ￿rst order conditions yield the




((x1 ￿ x2 ￿ x3)B ￿ A + w2 + w3)b + 2Bx1 + 2A
2 ￿ 2b2 + b
(8)
Substituting (8) into (6) and (7), we get the candidate equilibrium quantities for the
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q2 =
(b ￿ 2)(3b2 ￿ 4)A + b(3b2 ￿ 4)(Bx3 ￿ w3) + (8 ￿ b3 ￿ 6b2 + 4b)(Bx2 ￿ w2) ￿ bB(4 ￿ b2)x1
(2b2 ￿ b ￿ 2)(b ￿ 2)(b + 2)
(9)
q3 =
(b ￿ 2)(3b2 ￿ 4)A + b(3b2 ￿ 4)(Bx2 ￿ w2) + (8 ￿ b3 ￿ 6b2 + 4b)(Bx3 ￿ w3) ￿ bB(4 ￿ b2)x1
(2b2 ￿ b ￿ 2)(b ￿ 2)(b + 2)
(10)
Replacing for (8), (9) and (10) into the input suppliers￿pro￿ts we ￿nd the candidate
input prices:
w2 =
(b ￿ 2)(3b2 ￿ 4)AH + B(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)H1x2 + bB(3b2 ￿ 4)H2x3 + bB(b2 ￿ 4)Hx1
(5b3 + 12b2 ￿ 12b ￿ 16)(b3 ￿ 12b2 + 4b + 16)
w3 =
(b ￿ 2)(3b2 ￿ 4)AH + B(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)H1x3 + bB(3b2 ￿ 4)H2x2 + bB(b2 ￿ 4)Hx1
(5b3 + 12b2 ￿ 12b ￿ 16)(b3 ￿ 12b2 + 4b + 16)
H = (5b3 + 12b2 ￿ 12b ￿ 16)
H1 = (7b4 + 4b3 ￿ 36b2 + 32)
H2 = (b3 + 6b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 8)
We can now solve for the ￿rst stage of the game, where the independent upstream
units and the merged ￿rms set simultaneously and non-cooperatively research to maximise
pro￿ts; the ￿rst order conditions for this stage yield the equilibrium research e⁄orts:
x1 =
￿AB(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)
￿
(3b ￿ 4)(b + 2)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)B2H1H2 + (b2 ￿ 4)(3b ￿ 4)D1H2￿
(3b ￿ 4)(b + 2)H1H2(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)2B4 + (b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)DD1B2 + 4(b + 2)H(2b2 ￿ b ￿ 2)D3
1
x2 = x3 =
￿BA(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)H1H2
￿
(3b ￿ 4)(b + 2)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)B2 + 2(3b2 ￿ 4)D1
￿








2(4 ￿ 3b)(b + 2)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(3b2 ￿ 4)(b3 ￿ 12b2 + 4b + 16)
￿1=2
(3b ￿ 4)(b + 2)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)
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x1 =
AB(2 ￿ b)(3b ￿ 4)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(5b3 + 12b2 ￿ 12b ￿ 16)
(b + 2)(3b ￿ 4)2(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)2B2 + 4(2b2 ￿ b ￿ 2)(b3 ￿ 12b2 + 4b + 16)2
and
x2 = x3 = 0
Replacing back into the expressions for the equilibrium input prices:
w2 = w3 =
2A(b ￿ 2)(2b2 ￿ b ￿ 2)
￿
(3b ￿ 4)(b + 2)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)B2 + 2(3b2 ￿ 4)D1
￿






2(4 ￿ 3b)(b + 2)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(3b2 ￿ 4)(b3 ￿ 12b2 + 4b + 16)
￿1=2
(3b ￿ 4)(b + 2)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)
and substituting into the equilibrium quantities:
q1 = q2 =
A(b3 ￿ 12b2 + 4b + 16)
￿
(3b ￿ 4)(b + 2)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)B2 + 2(3b2 ￿ 4)D1
￿
(b + 2)[(b + 2)(3b ￿ 4)2(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)2B2 + 4(2b2 ￿ b ￿ 2)D1
2]
￿ 0
the competitive advantage of the merged units is so strong that the independent units
are driven out of the market.




2(4 ￿ 3b)(b + 2)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(3b2 ￿ 4)(b3 ￿ 12b2 + 4b + 16)
￿1=2
(3b ￿ 4)(b + 2)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)
we would still have a corner solution, where the non-integrated units don￿ t produce
research:
x1 =
(A ￿ C)B(2 ￿ b)(3b ￿ 4)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(5b3 + 12b2 ￿ 12b ￿ 16)
(b + 2)(3b ￿ 4)2(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)2B2 + 4(2b2 ￿ b ￿ 2)(b3 ￿ 12b2 + 4b + 16)2
x2 = x3 = 0
And substituting into the expressions for the candidate equilibrium input prices:
w2 = w3 =
(3b ￿ 4)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(b + 2)B2 ￿
2(b ￿ 2)(2b2 ￿ b ￿ 2)A ￿ CH2
￿
(b + 2)(3b ￿ 4)2(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)2B2 + 4(2b2 ￿ b ￿ 2)(b3 ￿ 12b2 + 4b + 16)2 +
(2b2 ￿ b ￿ 2)D1
￿
4(b ￿ 2)(3b2 ￿ 4)A ￿ 8C(b3 + 3b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)
￿
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which is always less than or equal to C.
Substituting w1 = w2 = C into the expressions for the equilibrium quantities, we get:
q1 = q2 =
(A ￿ C)(b3 ￿ 12b2 + 4b + 16)
￿
(3b ￿ 4)(b + 2)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)B2 + 2(3b2 ￿ 4)D1
￿
(b + 2)[(b + 2)(3b ￿ 4)2(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)2B2 + 4(2b2 ￿ b ￿ 2)D2
1]
￿ 0
and the outsiders are driven out of the market.
A.3. A downstream merger. Solving the game by backward induction, the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium yields the following expressions for the equilibrium research
levels:
x1 = x2 =
￿A(b2 ￿ 4)
￿
D2 ￿ 4(2b2 ￿ 3b ￿ 4)(3b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 4)
￿￿







b(3b2 ￿ 7b ￿ 8)(b2 ￿ 4)a2
B2 +






8A(3b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 8)(3b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 4)(2b3 ￿ 7b2 + 8)D2
BD
D = ￿4(b2 ￿ 2)(3b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 4)(9b7 ￿ 129b6 + 508b5 ￿ 96b4 ￿ 1792b3 + 224b2 + 2304b + 1024)B2 +
+(b2 ￿ 4)(b + 1)D1(b3 ￿ 7b2 + 4b + 8)B4 ￿ 128(3b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 8)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)(3b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 4)3 +
+2B(b ￿ 1)(b2 ￿ 4)(3b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 8)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)
￿
D2 ￿ 4(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(3b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 4)
￿
a +
+b(3b2 ￿ 7b ￿ 8)(b2 ￿ 4)2 ￿
D2 ￿ 4(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(3b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 4)
￿
a2
with D > 0
D1 = (3b5 ￿ 31b4 + 44b3 + 76b2 ￿ 64b ￿ 64) < 0
D2 = (b + 1)(b3 ￿ 7b2 + 4b + 8)B2 > 0
Hence, the equilibrium input price, quantity and pro￿t levels are:
w1 = w2 =
￿16A(b ￿ 1)(3b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 4)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)(3b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 8)
￿




￿4A(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)(3b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 4)D4
D
q1 = q2 =
A(b2 ￿ 4)(￿2b + 3b2 ￿ 4)(3b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 8)
￿




4(b + 1)(￿2b + 3b2 ￿ 4)AD4
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￿D(1;2) =
32A2(b + 1)(b2 ￿ 4)2(3b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 8)2(￿2b + 3b2 ￿ 4)2 ￿




16A2(b + 1)2(￿2b + 3b2 ￿ 4)2D2
4
D2
￿U1 = ￿U2 =
￿A2(b2 ￿ 4)
￿












D3 = ab(3b2 ￿ 7b ￿ 8)2(b2 ￿ 4)2 ￿
(b2 ￿ 4)ab + 2BD1
￿
+ (b2 ￿ 4)D2
1B2 +
64(b ￿ 1)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)(￿2b + 3b2 ￿ 4)2(3b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 8)2
D4 = b(3b2 ￿ 7b ￿ 8)(b2 ￿ 4)2a2 + 2B(b ￿ 1)(b2 ￿ 4)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(3b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 8)a +
(b2 ￿ 4)D1B2 ￿ 8(3b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 8)(3b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 4)(2b3 ￿ 7b2 + 8)
with D3 > 0 and D4 < 0
A.4. Three vertical mergers. Solving the model by backward induction, the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium research, quantity and pro￿ts levels for the three vertically
integrated units are:
x1V = x2V = x3V =
(b + 2)BA
4b3 ￿ 12b + bB2 + 2B2 ￿ 8
q1V = q2V = q3V = 2
(b + 1)(b ￿ 2)A
4b3 ￿ 12b + bB2 + 2B2 ￿ 8
￿1V = ￿2V = ￿3V =
(2b2 + bB ￿ 2b + 2B ￿ 4)(2b2 ￿ bB ￿ 2b ￿ 2B ￿ 4)A2
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A.5. Vertical and downstream horizontal mergers. Using backward induction,








x2 = x3 =
(b2 ￿ 4)
￿
D2B2 + b5 ￿ 22b3 + 44b2 ￿ 32
￿￿





D = ￿2(b2 + 4b ￿ 8)(2b8 ￿ 52b7 + 273b6 ￿ 260b5 ￿ 880b4 + 1152b3 + 1152b2 ￿ 1024b ￿ 768)B2 +
+(b ￿ 1)(b2 ￿ 4)(3b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 8)
￿
￿4D2B2 + 8(b2 + 4b ￿ 8)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)
￿
aB +
￿(b2 ￿ 4)D2D1B4 + 2(3b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 8)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)2(b2 + 4b ￿ 8)3 +
+(b ￿ 4)(b2 ￿ 4)2b
￿
D2B2 ￿ 2(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)(b2 + 4b ￿ 8)
￿
a2
D1 = b4 + 8b3 ￿ 32b2 + 32
D2 = (b3 ￿ 7b2 + 4b + 8)
D3 = (b2 + 4b ￿ 8)(3b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 8)(2b3 ￿ 7b2 + 8)
with D1;D2;D3;D > 0
Hence the equilibrium input prices, quantity and pro￿t levels are:
w2 = w3 =
￿4A(b ￿ 1)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)(b2 + 4b ￿ 8)(3b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 8)
￿




(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)(b2 + 4b ￿ 8)
￿






ba2(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)(b2 + 4b ￿ 8)(b ￿ 4)(b2 ￿ 4)2AB
D
q2 = q3 =
(b2 ￿ 4)(b2 + 4b ￿ 8)(3b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 8)
￿






￿ba2(b ￿ 4)(b2 ￿ 4)2 + 4B(b ￿ 1)(b2 ￿ 4)(3b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 8)a + (b2 ￿ 4)B2D1 + 2D3
￿2
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￿D(2;3) =
2A2(b + 1)(b2 ￿ 4)2(b2 + 4b ￿ 8)2(3b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 8)2 ￿
D2B2 + b5 ￿ 22b3 + 44b2 ￿ 32
￿2
D2
￿U2 = ￿U3 =
￿A2(b2 ￿ 4)
￿





D4 = (b2 + 4b ￿ 8)2(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)2 ￿ (b3 ￿ 7b2 + 4b + 8)2B2
D5 = (b2 ￿ 4)(b4 + 8b3 ￿ 32b2 + 32)2B2 + 4(b ￿ 1)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)(b2 + 4b ￿ 8)2(3b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 8)2 +
+b2(b ￿ 4)2(b2 ￿ 4)3a2 ￿ 2bB(b ￿ 4)(b4 + 8b3 ￿ 32b2 + 32)(b2 ￿ 4)2a
with D4,D5 > 0
A.6. Vertical and downstream/upstream mergers. Solving the game by back-
ward induction, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium yields the following expressions for
the equilibrium variables:
x1 =
AB(4 + 4b ￿ b2)(2b2 ￿ 4b + a2 + B2 + 2aB ￿ 8)
D
x2 = x3 =
￿A(4b3 + b2B2 ￿ 16b2 ￿ 4bB2 + 8b + 16 ￿ 4B2)(a + B)
D
w2 = w3 =
2A(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)(4b3 + b2B2 ￿ 16b2 ￿ 4bB2 + 8b + 16 ￿ 4B2)
D
q1 =
￿4(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)(2b2 ￿ 4b + a2 + B2 + 2aB ￿ 8)A
D
q2 = q3 =
￿2(4b3 + b2B2 ￿ 16b2 ￿ 4bB2 + 8b + 16 ￿ 4B2)A
D
￿V 1 =
￿A2(b2B + 4b2 ￿ 4bB ￿ 8b ￿ 4B ￿ 8)(b2B ￿ 4b2 ￿ 4bB + 8b ￿ 4B + 8)D1
D2
￿D(2;3) =
8A2(b + 1)(4b3 + b2B2 ￿ 16b2 ￿ 4bB2 + 8b ￿ 4B2 + 16)2
D2
￿U(2;3) =
￿2A2(4b3 + b2B2 ￿ 16b2 ￿ 4bB2 + 8b ￿ 4B2 + 16)2(4b2 ￿ 8b + 2aB ￿ 8 + a2 + B2)
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where:
0 > D = (b2B2 ￿ 4bB2 + 16b ￿ 8b2 ￿ 4B2 + 16)a2 + 2(b2B2 ￿ 4bB2 + 16b ￿ 8b2 ￿ 4B2 + 16)Ba +
(b2 ￿ 4 ￿ 4b)B4 + (2b4 + 48 ￿ 16b3 + 80b + 8b2)B2 ￿ 32(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)2
D1 = (2b2 ￿ 4b + a2 + B2 + 2aB ￿ 8)2
A.7. Vertical and horizontal integration. Solving the model by backward induc-
tion, we ￿nd that, for
B ￿
ba(b3 ￿ 4b2 + 8 + 4b) + 2
￿
2(1 ￿ b)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)2(b4 ￿ 4b3 ￿ 4b2 + 8b ￿ 2ba2 + 8 ￿ 2a2)
￿1=2
￿4b2 + 8b + b4 ￿ 4b3 + 8





￿2ba ￿ 2a + 2(4 ￿ 2b3 + 2b2 + 8b)1=2
1 + b
it is characterised by:
x1 =
AB(b + 1)(2b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4 + ba2 + a2 + 2abB + 2Ba + bB2 + B2)
K2
x2 = x3 =
￿A(B + a)(b + 1)(b3 ￿ 4b2 ￿ bB2 + 2b ￿ B2 + 4)
K2
q1 =
￿A(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)(2b2 ￿ 4b + ba2 + 2Bba + bB2 ￿ 4 + a2 + 2Ba + B2)
K2
q2 = q3 =
A(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)(b3 ￿ 4b3 ￿ bB2 + 2b + 4 ￿ B2)
K2
￿1V =
A2(b2 + bB ￿ 2b + B ￿ 2)(b2 ￿ bB ￿ 2b ￿ B ￿ 2)K
K2
2
￿2V = ￿3V = ￿




K = (2b2 ￿ 4b + ba2 + 2Bba + bB2 ￿ 4 + a2 + 2Ba + B2)2
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K2 = 2(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)3 ￿ 2(b + 2)(b + 1)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)B2 ￿ (b + 1)4 ￿
+(b + 1)(2b2 + bB2 ￿ 4b + B2 ￿ 4)(2Ba + 1)
and K2 < 0, for a < a￿,
where
a￿ = ￿
B(b + 1)G + [2(b + 1)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)(￿bB ￿ B ￿ 2 ￿ 2b + b2)(bB + B ￿ 2 ￿ 2b + b2)G]1=2
(b + 1)G
and G = (bB2 + B2 ￿ 4 ￿ 4b + 2b2)
For B ￿ B￿and a 6= a￿, Figure 23, we have a corner solution where
x1 = 0
x2 = x3 =
1
2
A(b + 1)(2 ￿ b)(a + B)
b4 ￿ 4b3 + 8b ￿ 2Bba ￿ ba2 ￿ bB2 ￿ B2 ￿ a2 + 4 ￿ 2Ba
Replacing back into the expressions for the equilibrium quantities:
q2 = q3 =
1
2
(b ￿ 2)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)A












a(a + 2B)(b + 1) + 2b2 + (B ￿ 2)(B + 2)(b + 1)
b4 ￿ 4b3 + 8b ￿ 2Bba ￿ ba2 ￿ bB2 ￿ B2 ￿ a2 + 4 ￿ 2Ba
￿ 0
for B ￿ B￿
and the initial integrated unit is therefore driven out of the market.
A.8. Downstream and upstream mergers. Solving the model by backward induc-
tion, we ￿nd the equilibrium research levels:
x1 = x2 =
￿(a + B)A(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)
￿




￿BA(b + 1)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)
￿
(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(a + B)2 + (b2 ￿ 8b ￿ 8)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 4)
￿
D
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D = (b + 1)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)2(B + 2a)B3 + (b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)2(b3 ￿ 6b2 + a2b ￿ 24b ￿ 16 + a2)B2 ￿
2a(b2 ￿ 8b ￿ 8)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)2B + (b2 ￿ 8b ￿ 8)
￿
(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)2a2 + (b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)(b2 ￿ 8b ￿ 8)2￿
is always positive
Hence the equilibrium input price, quantity and pro￿t levels are:
w1 = w2 =
A(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)(b2 ￿ 8b ￿ 8)
￿




A(b2 ￿ 8b ￿ 8)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)
￿
(￿4 ￿ 4b + b2)(a + B)2 + (b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 4)(b2 ￿ 8b ￿ 8)
￿
D
q1 = q2 =
￿A(b2 ￿ 8b ￿ 8)
￿




￿A(b + 1)(b2 ￿ 8b ￿ 8)
￿




2A2(b + 1)(b2 ￿ 8b ￿ 8)2 ￿




A2(b + 1)2(b2 ￿ 8b ￿ 8)2 ￿

















D1 = (￿4 ￿ 4b + b2)2(a + B)2 + (b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)(b2 ￿ 8b ￿ 8)2 < 0
D2 = (b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(a + B)2 ￿ 10b3 + 48b + 4b2 + 32Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 63
A.9. Downstream mergers and vertical integration. Solving the model by back-
ward induction, we ￿nd that for
B <
￿a(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4) ￿ 2
￿
2(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)
￿1=2
(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)
the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is characterised by the following positive values
of research, input price, output and pro￿t levels:
x1 = x2 =
A(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(4b2 + bB2 ￿ 6b ￿ 8 + B2)(B + a)
K
x3 = AB
(1 + b)(a2 ￿ 8 + 2Ba + B2)b2 ￿ 4(B + a + 2)(B + a ￿ 2)(b + 1)2
K
w3 =
￿2A(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)((a2 ￿ 8 + 2Ba + B2)b2 ￿ 4(B + a + 2)(B + a ￿ 2)(b + 1))
K
q1 = q2 =
4(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)(4b2 + bB2 ￿ 6b + B2 ￿ 8)A
K
q3 =
2A(b + 1)((a2 ￿ 8 + 2Ba + B2)b2 ￿ 4(B + a + 2)(B + a ￿ 2)(b + 1))
K
￿1 = ￿2 =
￿2A2(4b2 ￿ 6b + bB2 ￿ 8 + B2)2K1
K2
￿D3 =
4A2(b + 1)2((￿8 + 2Ba + a2 + B2)b2 ￿ 4(B + a + 2)(B + a ￿ 2)(b + 1))2
K2
￿U3 =
A2(b + 1)(8 ￿ B2 + 8b ￿ bB2 ￿ 4b2)((￿8 + 2Ba + a2 + B2)b2 ￿ 4(B + a + 2)(B + a ￿ 2)(b + 1))2
K2
where
K = 32(b + 1)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)2 ￿ (48 + 112b + 56b2 ￿ 16b3 ￿ 6b4)B2 ￿ (b + 1)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)B4
￿a(a + 2B)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(2b2 + bB2 ￿ 8b + B2 ￿ 8)
is always positive and
K1 = (b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(a2 + 2Ba + B2) ￿ 16(b + 1)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)2 < 0Horizontal and Vertical Integration in the Presence of Research Spillovers 64
Further if the research spillover is su¢ ciently strong
B ￿
￿a(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4) ￿ 2
￿
2(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)
￿1=2
(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)
we have a corner solution where
x3 = 0
and
x1 = x2 =
￿A(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(2b2 ￿ 3b ￿ 4)(B + a)
a(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(a + 2B)[(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)2B2 ￿ 16(b + 1)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)2]
Replacing back into the expression for the equilibrium input price, we get:
w3 =
A(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)
￿
a(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(a + 2B) + (b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)2B2 ￿ 8b2 + 16 + 16b
￿




￿a(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4) ￿ 2
￿
2(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)
￿1=2
(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)





a(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(a + 2B) + (b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)2B2 ￿ 8b2 + 16 + 16b
￿
a(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)(a + 2B)[(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 4)2B2 ￿ 16(b + 1)(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)2]
￿ 0
and both the upstream and the downstream outsiders are driven out of the market.
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